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The Yale Journal of International Law Online

Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith
Chimène I. Keitner†
It is often tempting to read statutes the way one thinks they ought to have
been written. This impulse, though understandable, can create more problems
than it solves. Such is the case with applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA)1 to suits against current and former foreign officials, as Curt
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have recently proposed.2
Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the FSIA’s grant of immunity to “a
foreign state”3 should be read to include current and former foreign officials for
actions taken in their official capacity. 4 Under their interpretation, “official
capacity” actions would include “human rights abuses” and other violations of
international law that “require state action,” 5 such as the alleged torture and
extrajudicial killing of a seventeen-year-old “in retaliation for his father’s political
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Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
represented amici Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law in Support of
Respondents in Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08–1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010).
Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
(2006)).
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials,
and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9 (2009) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith,
Foreign Sovereign Immunity].
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 13.
Id. at 10. Bradley and Goldsmith use a number of terms to refer to suits they believe should
come within the scope of the FSIA, including suits for “abuses committed . . . under color of
state law,” id. at 9, suits for “official acts,” id. at 12, suits for “actions carried out on behalf of
the state,” id. at 13, “official capacity suits,” id. at 15, and “suits against individual state
officers who act in an official capacity,” id. at 16. However, even if certain “official acts” are
deemed to fall within the scope of the FSIA, it is not self-evident that acts that violate
international law, or the foreign state’s own law, can constitute “official acts” for immunity
purposes. See, e.g., Brief of Dolly Filártiga et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Respondents at
18, Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08-1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010) (positing that “a court must
determine, first, what authority a state has actually granted to an official and, second, what
authority domestic and international law permit a state to grant lawfully to an official”).
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activities and beliefs” at issue in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.6 They reject the familiar
distinction in U.S. law between the capacity in which an individual official has
acted, and the capacity in which that official is sued, as applied to foreign
officials. 7 Unless a foreign state chooses to waive its immunity, Bradley and
Goldsmith’s interpretation would deprive U.S. courts of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction in suits against current and former officials where the conduct
at issue does not fall within an existing exception to the FSIA.8 This result would
create a categorical barrier to most human rights suits beyond those contemplated
by existing immunities and other applicable restrictions.
Bradley and Goldsmith appeal to three basic sources of support for their
proposal: (1) logic, (2) policy, and (3) international law. In this brief essay, I
examine each of these sources in turn. I conclude that these sources do not
support reading the FSIA to encompass suits against natural persons, even when
such persons have acted under color of foreign law. Unless the Supreme Court
decides to write its own statute when it decides Samantar v. Yousuf,9 or Congress
enacts a comprehensive statute regulating foreign officials’ immunities, current
and former foreign officials should continue to invoke the well-established
sources of immunity that they already have under relevant treaties, customary
international law, and the common law,10 without creating the myriad problems
associated with forcing individuals into the ill-fitting text of the FSIA.
Stated briefly, the observation that “a state acts through individuals” 11
does not support Bradley and Goldsmith’s proposal as a matter of logic, because
both U.S. and international law attribute personal responsibility to individuals for
certain types of illegal conduct precisely because they engage in such conduct
under color of law. When a certain criterion defines conduct as illegal, it does not
make sense for that same criterion to place individuals who have engaged in that
conduct categorically beyond the reach of U.S. courts. Nor do policy
considerations support Bradley and Goldsmith’s proposal. There are at least three
reasons for this: the FSIA was not designed to include individuals, reading it to do
so would conflict with the Torture Victim Protection Act, and various specialized
immunities and other non-statutory doctrines already afford substantial

6.
7.

Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991) (indicating that, in a § 1983 action, “the
phrase ‘acting in their official capacities’ is best understood as a reference to the capacity in
which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged
injury.”). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and
Domestic Officer Suits, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 137 (2009) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith,
Domestic Officer Suits] (rejecting this approach in suits against foreign officials).
8. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 22; see also 28 U.S.C. §
1605 (2006) (listing exceptions).
9. No. 08-1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010).
10. See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
11. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 13.
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protections to foreign officials and to the interests of foreign states in U.S. courts.
Finally, neither international treaties nor customary international law require
treating all “official capacity suits” as suits against the state itself, without regard
to the conduct at issue. It would be anomalous to find that international law
categorically prevents states from holding individuals accountable for universally
condemned violations of international law.
LOGIC
Logic does not support Bradley and Goldsmith’s reading of the FSIA
because both U.S. and international law make individuals liable for engaging in
certain types of conduct precisely because they act under color of law. It would be
self-defeating for the same criterion to both create and preclude liability.
Before Samantar reached the Supreme Court this term, courts and litigants
had assumed that, if the FSIA could include suits against individual officials, this
was because a given official qualified as an “agency or instrumentality” of the
foreign state under § 1603(b). However, as Chief Justice Roberts noted during
oral argument in Samantar, the FSIA “says that an agency or instrumentality is an
entity [and] we usually don’t think of individuals as being entities.”12
The decision most often cited for the “agency or instrumentality” approach
is that of the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank. 13 The
Chuidian court observed that “[o]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.” 14 The Chuidian court mistakenly believed that the only alternatives to
reading the FSIA to include individuals were either to find no immunity for
individuals, or to give the State Department complete discretion over
determinations of individual immunity.15 The court held that individuals acting in
their official capacity are agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states in order to
avoid these results.
Bradley and Goldsmith share some of the Chuidian court’s concerns, but
they propose an alternative solution. Instead of viewing individuals as agencies or
instrumentalities of foreign states, they argue that “[s]ince a state acts through
individuals, a suit against an individual official for actions carried out on behalf of

12. Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08-1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3,
2010).
13. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
14. Id. at 1101–02 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
15. Although the role of the Executive Branch is beyond the scope of this response, it bears
noting that the Executive Branch is responsible for determining an individual’s entitlement to
status-based immunity, because the Executive is charged with accrediting diplomats and
recognizing foreign heads of state. By contrast, the views of the Executive Branch are
important—but not dispositive—in determining the scope of conduct-based immunity.
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the state is in reality a suit against the foreign state [itself] . . . .”16 Accordingly,
they contend that suits against current or former foreign officials for actions taken
in their official capacity (which they define broadly to include all actions “carried
out on behalf of the state”) are suits against the state “even if that is not how the
plaintiff captions his or her complaint.”17
Their appeal to logic proceeds as follows: (A) states can only act through
individuals, so (B) a suit against an individual for actions taken in his or her
official capacity must be a suit against the state, not against the individual.
Although (A) is uncontroversial, (B) does not follow as a logical result. Notably, a
similar observation about the relationship between state action and individual
action led to a strikingly different result at Nuremberg, where the tribunal
concluded that because “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men,
not by abstract entities,” it was both appropriate and necessary to impose
individual responsibility on individuals who had acted on behalf of the Nazi
regime.18 Imposing individual responsibility for acts that might also entail state
responsibility is not illogical because, as the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
recognize, state responsibility and individual responsibility are not mutually
exclusive. 19 Were it otherwise, any would-be international law violator could
receive a “free pass” by using state authority to commit the violation. This would
turn the very premise of much international human rights law on its head—
namely, that certain actions rise to the level of international law violations
precisely because they involve the abuse of state authority.20
When an individual is a named defendant, the question is how to
determine when the state, and not the individual, is the real party in interest. The
FSIA provides no guidance on this question. If the state is the real party in
interest, the individual defendant can properly invoke common law immunity.
There is no need to treat the action as if it had been brought under the FSIA.
Courts in other countries have approached the problem of determining the
real party in interest by focusing on the nature of the relief sought. For example,
the Irish Supreme Court denied immunity to a Spanish colonel in an action for
damages arising from a contract to carry horses from Dublin to Lisbon for use by

16. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 13.
17. Id. at 5.
18. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 223 (1947).
19. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, art. 58, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third
Session, ¶ 76, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
20. The paradigmatic example of this is torture, which by definition must be “inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.” United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 102 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85.

Spring 2010

Officially Immune?

5

the Spanish Army because “in the proceedings, as framed, no relief is sought
against any person save the appellant. He is sued in his personal capacity and . . .
any judgment . . . against him, will bind merely the appellant personally, and . . .
cannot be enforced against any property save that of the appellant.”21 The Court in
this case thus recognized a meaningful distinction between a suit against an
individual official and a suit against the state, even where the state might
ultimately indemnify the individual.22
This focus on the nature of the requested relief is reflected in other foreign
cases from various periods, including those cited by Bradley and Goldsmith. For
example, a German court dismissed a suit against a current U.K. official for
injunctive relief that would have compelled the United Kingdom to act contrary to
a treaty obligation.23 A U.K. court dismissed a suit against companies acting as
the agents of a foreign government in London for money damages from the state
treasury based on common law immunity and because the foreign state was a
necessary party.24 A U.K. court also dismissed a suit against a current official who
had no plausible connection to the alleged misconduct because he was not in
office when the conduct occurred. 25 These cases do not support Bradley and
Goldsmith’s claim that suits seeking to impose liability directly on individuals for
torture and extrajudicial killing come within the scope of the FSIA, or that the
defendants in such suits are entitled to immunity under the FSIA by virtue of the
“official” nature of their conduct.
It may be true, in some metaphysical sense, that a state can only act
through individuals. But it does not follow that individuals who act on behalf of
the state should be treated as the state itself for all purposes. As Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht observed in 1951, “the state always acts as a public person. It cannot
act otherwise. In a real sense all acts jure gestionis [commercial activities] are acts

21. Saorstat & Cont’l Steamship Co. v. De las Morenas, [1945] I.R. 291, 300, reprinted in 12
I.L.R. 97, 98 (Ir.).
22. Id. at 301 (finding that the possibility of indemnification by the Spanish Government did not
turn the suit into one against the Government). But see Jaffe v. Miller, [1993] 13 O.R. (3d)
745, 759 (C.A.) (Can.) (giving greater weight to indemnification); Bradley & Goldsmith,
Domestic Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 148 (same).
23. Church of Scientology Case, 65 I.L.R. 193 (BGH 1978) (F.R.G.) (dismissing suit for
injunction against current head of New Scotland Yard to prevent compliance with a document
request from Germany under a 1961 Agreement), cited in Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 15 n.22.
24. Twycross v. Dreyfus, (1877) 5 Ch.D. 605 (C.A.) (Eng.) (finding lack of jurisdiction over
claim to proceeds of the sale of guano owned by the Republic of Peru because the Republic
was a necessary party as the owner of the guano), cited in Bradley & Goldsmith, Domestic
Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 142 n.20.
25. Propend Finance Pty. Ltd. v. Sing, 111 I.L.R. 611, 662 (C.A. 1997) (Eng.) (finding no basis
for suing current Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police Force for an improper fax
sent by Australian diplomat, where the Commissioner in office at the time the fax was sent
had died by the time of suit).
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jure imperii [sovereign activities].”26 However, as Lauterpacht emphasized and
the FSIA reflects, “the logical consequence” of that observation is not necessarily
the grant of absolute immunity for commercial activities. 27 Moreover, as the
Supreme Court held in Hafer v. Melo, it makes no sense for the very criteria that
define a violation (such as a requirement that the defendant acted under color of
law) to shield the defendant from legal consequences.28 Bradley and Goldsmith’s
proposal compels this illogical result.
POLICY
Considerations of policy do not support Bradley and Goldsmith’s
proposal. The reading they propose of the FSIA does not fit into the design of the
statute and would substantially negate the Torture Victim Protection Act.
Furthermore, various specialized immunities and other common law doctrines
already provide protection for foreign officials, and for the interests of foreign
states, when such protection is warranted.
The omission of foreign officials from the FSIA was not an oversight.
Rather, Congress was concerned primarily with regulating suits against foreign
states and state-owned enterprises, not suits against individuals. Immunity for
state entities had been governed since 1952 by the standards set out in the socalled Tate Letter, which differentiates between sovereign activities, for which
state entities are deemed immune, and commercial activities, for which they are
not.29 Congress enacted the FSIA to codify the Tate Letter and give the courts
authority over its application.30
Given the reasons for which Congress enacted the FSIA, it is not difficult
to see why suits brought against individuals fall outside its scope, even when
those suits involve actions taken in an “official capacity.” An authoritative
compilation of pre-FSIA immunity decisions, published at the time of the FSIA’s
enactment, makes clear that “the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not deal
with the immunity of individual officials, but only that of foreign states . . . .”31
Former State Department Acting Legal Adviser Mark Feldman, who participated
in drafting the FSIA, later stated that “[i]t was never the intention of the drafters

26. H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 220, 224 (1951).
27. Id.
28. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1991).
29. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting
Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 984–85 (1952).
30. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cen. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486–89 (1983).
31. See Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Dep’t of State, May 1952 to January 1977, 1977
DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT’L L. 1017, 1020 (appendix).
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of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to encompass [foreign officials].”32 This
has also been the consistent position of the U.S. government.33
Rewriting history to include suits against individuals within the text of the
FSIA, as Bradley and Goldsmith propose, would create numerous problems.
Although these problems are not the main focus of this response, three bear
mentioning. First, the FSIA states that “a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States” except as provided in the FSIA
itself. 34 The FSIA does not distinguish between civil and criminal jurisdiction,
and it does not contain an exception for criminal proceedings. Therefore, reading
suits against individuals into the FSIA would inadvertently confer both civil and
criminal immunity on individuals for their non-commercial activities. This could
interfere with the United States’s ability to prosecute individuals involved in
offenses carried out with the tacit or explicit approval of a foreign state.35
Second, reading suits against individuals into the text of the FSIA would
make the commercial activities exception to immunity applicable to all suits
involving actions taken in an “official capacity,” including suits against sitting
heads of state. This would prevent U.S. courts from recognizing the absolute
immunity of sitting heads of state, since such immunity was not codified in an
international agreement to which the United States was a party at the time the
FSIA was enacted (which is the only recognized basis for derogations from the
textual provisions of the FSIA).36
Third, 28 U.S.C. § 1608, which establishes the method of service of
process for suits brought under the FSIA, contains no provision for service of
process on individuals sued in their official capacity, or individuals sued in their
individual capacity for acts performed on the state’s behalf. 37 It is therefore
unclear what steps a plaintiff would need to take to secure personal jurisdiction
over an individual defendant if the suit is governed by the FSIA. Moreover,
Bradley and Goldsmith’s reading of the FSIA would pose problems for
defendants as well, since the FSIA broadly equates service of process with
personal jurisdiction without reference to a minimum contacts requirement.38 It is
therefore possible that treating claims against individuals as coming within the

32. Foreign Governments in United States Courts: Discussion, 85 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 276
(1991) (statement by Mark Feldman).
33. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Samantar v. Yousuf,
No. 81–1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010); Statement of Interest of the United States, Chuidian
v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, No. 86–2255 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 21, 1988).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (emphasis added).
35. See United States v. Emmanuel, 2007 WL 2002452 at *12-13 (S.D. Fla., July 5, 2007) (order
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment) (rejecting sovereign immunity defense
to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2340 for torture in Liberia).
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
37. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(2)–(3) with 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2006).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2006).
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FSIA’s definition of a “foreign state” could raise due process concerns. These
problems arise because those who drafted and enacted the FSIA did not intend it
to apply to suits against individuals.
Reading the FSIA as it was actually written, to apply to states and not to
individuals, reflects Congress’s own understanding, as a contrary reading not only
does not fit into the design of the FSIA but also substantially negates the
subsequently enacted Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). 39 The
TVPA provides a cause of action to U.S. citizens and aliens for torture or
extrajudicial killing against an individual defendant who acted “under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.”40 In order for Bradley
and Goldsmith’s interpretation of the FSIA to be plausible, one must assume that
Congress engaged in a futile exercise of creating a specific cause of action for a
class of activity that is, by definition, immune from suit by virtue of having been
performed under color of foreign law. In interpreting potentially conflicting
statutes, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a court “must read the statutes to
give effect to each if [it] can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.”41
Reading the FSIA to bar suits against current or former officials for torture and
extrajudicial killing would violate this basic principle of statutory interpretation.
In addition to these tensions with surrounding statutory law, Bradley and
Goldsmith’s reading of the FSIA is also largely superfluous, because it neglects
well established immunities for individuals outside the FSIA. Foreign officials
already benefit from a host of specialized immunities under relevant treaties,
customary international law, and the common law. As Bradley and Goldsmith
indicate, international law differentiates between status-based (ratione personae)
and conduct-based (ratione materiae) immunity from the jurisdiction of national
courts.42 Status-based immunities, such as the immunity afforded sitting heads of
state as a matter of customary international law, 43 and the immunity afforded
diplomats under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,44 are absolute
during an official’s tenure in office. Courts will, accordingly, dismiss suits
brought against current heads of state or current diplomats. They will also dismiss
suits against defendants who are served while they are present in the United States
to conduct official government business as part of a “special diplomatic mission,”

39. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
40. Id. § 2(a).
41. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551(1974)).
42. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 18.
43. See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004), cited in Bradley & Goldsmith,
Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 19 n.33; see also Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 22 (Feb. 14) (holding that an incumbent
foreign minister is entitled to status-based immunity).
44. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 96.
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as determined by the State Department. 45 Conduct-based immunity is both
narrower and broader than status-based immunity: it is narrower, because it only
provides immunity for specific acts (such as those performed in the exercise of
diplomatic or consular functions), but it is also broader, because it endures even
after an individual has left office.46 If Congress had sought to consolidate all these
types and sources of immunity into one overarching statute, the 1976 FSIA is not
what it would have enacted.
The United States can keep human rights suits within appropriate limits
without shoehorning individuals into the ill-fitting text of the FSIA. Under the
TVPA and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), U.S. courts can only assert subject
matter jurisdiction over a small number of universally recognized international
law violations.47 These constraints mean that there is a limited class of potential
defendants worldwide, few of whom are present in the United States at any given
time and thus subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The political
question doctrine, the act of state doctrine, and procedural determinations such as
whether the state is a necessary party also provide mechanisms for dismissing
TVPA and ATS suits when warranted to protect diplomatic relations and
minimize interference with the conduct of foreign affairs.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Bradley and Goldsmith claim that “the United States would violate
international law if it failed to confer immunity on state officials for their official
acts committed while in office.” 48 However, neither international treaties nor
customary international law require treating all “official capacity suits” as suits
against the state, without regard to the conduct at issue. It would be passing
strange to find that international law categorically prevents states from holding
individuals accountable for universally recognized violations of international law.
Bradley and Goldsmith invoke the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property because it defines “state” to include
“representatives of the State acting in that capacity.”49 However, the United States

45. See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States at 11 n.9, Li
Weixum v. Bo Xilai, Civ. No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. filed July 24, 2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98832.pdf (suggesting immunity from service
of process for invitee of the Executive branch but emphasizing that “[s]pecial mission
immunity would not . . . encompass all foreign official travel”).
46. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 44, art. 39(2); Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations art. 53(4), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (construing the
ATS).
48. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 16.
49. Id. at 15 (citing United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property art. 2(1)(b)(iv), opened for signature Dec. 16, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 803).
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has not signed the Convention and is unlikely to do so because it differs
substantially from the terms of the FSIA. 50 Moreover, this Convention, which
deals largely with state liability for commercial transactions, has not yet obtained
the thirty ratifications required to enter into force. Absent a basis in treaty law,
Bradley and Goldsmith’s claim must rely on their interpretation of customary
international law, which “results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”51 However, although various
national courts have found individual foreign officials immune for various types
of conduct in various circumstances, there is no “general and consistent” practice
of states granting conduct-based immunity to foreign officials—let alone former
foreign officials—for conduct such as torture and extrajudicial killing. In fact,
there is significant practice to the contrary.
Particularly since World War II, states have created and supported
international courts that explicitly reject official capacity defenses to international
law violations within their jurisdiction.52 As the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia has emphasized, “those responsible for [conduct
within the tribunal’s jurisdiction] cannot invoke immunity from national or
international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting in their
official capacity,” just as spies “although acting as State organs, may be held
personally accountable for their wrongdoing.” 53 This principle of individual
responsibility is not confined to international proceedings. Numerous domestic
statutes reject official capacity defenses to international crimes such as torture,
genocide, and crimes against humanity, and allow injured parties to seek civil

50. See David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 194, 205 (2005) (noting that the Convention does not contain
exceptions for expropriation or terrorism); see also id. at 210–11 (noting other U.S.
objections).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987). Customary international law is binding on the United States, although academic
debates persist about the status of customary international law as federal common law in the
wake of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) with Curtis A. Bradley
and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of
the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
52. E.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(2), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145;
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(2), S.C. Res. 955, Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993); Charter of the International
Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
53. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case IT-95-14-PT, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia
for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 41 (29 Oct., 1997),
reprinted in [1997] 110 I.L.R. 607.
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damages as part of criminal proceedings. 54 Ignoring the established lack of
immunity for these crimes in international courts and in certain domestic
proceedings neglects an important aspect of state practice in this area.
Early cases cited by Bradley and Goldsmith to illustrate the “rule” of
immunity that “prevailed” in the United States 55 actually show the absence of
blanket immunity. As early as 1794, Attorney General William Bradford was
asked to opine on a suit brought in Pennsylvania state court against General
George Henri Victor Collot for his conduct while Governor and Commander in
Chief of the French colony of Guadeloupe. Bradford declined to intervene on
France’s behalf, stating that “[w]ith respect to his suability, [the former Governor]
is on a footing with any other foreigner (not a public minister) who comes within
the jurisdiction of our courts.”56 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that
the defendant could be held to bail, whether or not he would ultimately be found
liable for his conduct.57 Three years later, Attorney General Charles Lee stated
that, even though “a person acting under a commission from the sovereign of a
foreign nation is not amenable” in U.S. court “for what he does in pursuance of
his commission,” the claims brought in Virginia against British privateer Henry
Sinclair were “entitled to a trial according to law . . . .”58 In 1841, the New York
Supreme Court (the highest court of general jurisdiction sitting in New York at
that time) rejected the claim to immunity of Alexander McLeod, a British subject
and former deputy sheriff of the Niagara District in Upper Canada who was
implicated in the 1837 attack on the steamboat Caroline. McLeod had been
arrested and charged with the crimes of arson and murder, and civil claims were
also brought against him. The court, which included future U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Nelson, held that Britain had not “placed the offenders above the
law, and beyond our jurisdiction, by adopting and approving [the defendant’s]
crime.”59
Bradley and Goldsmith attempt to distinguish these early opinions on the
grounds that they involved state court proceedings, and were thus beyond the
reach of the federal government. 60 However, had a principle of immunity for

54. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 45,
71 n. 110 (2007) (enumerating domestic statutes).
55. Bradley & Goldsmith, Domestic Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 142–43.
56. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 46 (1794).
57. Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247, 248 (1796).
58. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797). A correction was made to the Article on September 29, 2010. The
word “privateer” was substituted for “Navy Captain” in the text accompanying this footnote.
59. People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). Two other nineteenthcentury cases sometimes cited for immunity principles in fact involved what we now know as
the act of state doctrine. Both cases were tried on the merits, which a finding of jurisdictional
immunity would have precluded. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Hatch v.
Baez, 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596 (1876).
60. Bradley & Goldsmith, Domestic Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 142–43 nn.21–22 & 25.
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“official acts” been well established in international law or common law at the
time, presumably at least one of these courts would have applied it.
Bradley and Goldsmith also overstate the case when they assert that
“[m]any courts around the world have concluded that the international law of
foreign sovereign immunity applies to suits against officials acting in an official
capacity.” 61 Although courts have certainly found immunity in a variety of
contexts, some of these cases involved suits for injunctive relief, suits for
monetary relief from the state itself, or suits against individuals who had no
plausible personal connection to the alleged misconduct. 62 Others involved the
application of domestic immunity statutes whose text, unlike that of the FSIA,
could plausibly be read to encompass individuals. 63 None involved the direct
application of customary international law principles of immunity to allegations
of torture and extrajudicial killing. For example, in Zoernsch v. Waldock, a U.K.
appeals court found that the current Secretary of the European Commission of
Human Rights was entitled to immunity under an Order of the Council of Europe
in a suit alleging that he had presented an edited version of the plaintiff’s claim,
rather than the entire claim in plaintiff’s own words, to the Commission. 64 In
Zoernsch, Lord Diplock, the “eminent British judge”65 whose speech Bradley and
Goldsmith rely on, cited Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad on the question of
conduct-based immunity.66 In Rahimtoola, the House of Lords found that a suit
against the former High Commissioner of Pakistan was barred by sovereign
immunity because it involved determining Pakistan’s entitlement to funds held in
a London bank account. The House of Lords’s decision in Rahimtoola thus
typifies those cases that name individual defendants but are appropriately barred
by principles of immunity because “the effect of exercising jurisdiction [over the
individual defendant] would be to enforce a rule of law against the state”.67
Unlike the conduct at issue in Zoernsch and Rahimtoola, the alleged
conduct at issue in ATS cases such as Filártiga and TVPA cases such as
Samantar entails personal responsibility as a matter of international law. National
courts can, in appropriate circumstances, impose legal consequences for such
conduct. This is true even though the state might also bear responsibility, and
even though the state itself might be immune from suit in a foreign court.

61. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 15.
62. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.); Jaffe v. Miller, [1993] 13 O.R. (3d) 745, 790 (C.A.) (Can.).
64. Zoernsch v. Waldock, (1964) 2 All E.R. 256 (C.A.) (Eng.); see Bradley & Goldsmith,
Domestic Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 141.
65. Bradley & Goldsmith, Domestic Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 141.
66. Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1958] A.C. 379 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U NITED S TATES §
66(f) (1965).
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The U.K. House of Lords’s analysis in Jones v. Saudi Arabia does not
alter this conclusion, because that case asked whether Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (which provides for access to courts) requires
finding an implied exception to immunity under the U.K. State Immunity Act.68
The House of Lords concluded that it does not, and the petitioners in that case
have sought a hearing before the European Court of Human Rights. But even if
the European Court of Human Rights agrees with the House of Lords, it would
not mean that customary international law requires granting conduct-based
immunity for torture under the FSIA, as Bradley and Goldsmith argue.69 Reading
the House of Lords’s decision to require granting immunity for torture under the
FSIA ignores that, in the U.K., the burden is on the plaintiff to show that
international law requires an exception to the immunity created by a domestic
statute. In the United States, by contrast, the burden is on the defendant to show
that immunity exists in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Bradley and Goldsmith take issue with human rights suits because they
have “no basis in any . . . act of state consent.”70 What this neglects, however, is
the exclusive and absolute jurisdiction of the United States over its own
territory.71 Peña-Irala overstayed his visa and was living in Brooklyn, New York.
Samantar has lived in Fairfax, Virginia since the 1990s. Applying the FSIA to
grant immunity to current and former officials for any non-commercial conduct
performed under color of foreign law would categorically preclude U.S. courts
from exercising jurisdiction over certain claims against individuals present on
U.S. territory, even in cases brought by U.S. citizens and, potentially, by the U.S.
government.
Determining the scope of conduct-based immunity is not a new problem,
and applying the FSIA is not the proper solution. The fact that, in the thirty years
since Filártiga,72 few courts have explicitly considered or granted conduct-based
(as opposed to status-based) immunity to individual defendants for international
law violations should not be taken to mean that lawyers and judges have been

68. Jones v. Saudi Arabia, supra note 63; Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity,
supra note 2, at 15 n.22.
69. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 16.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
72. The Filártiga court appears to have considered, at least in passing, the possibility of immunity
outside the FSIA. This can be inferred from the court’s observation that Peña-Irala did not
claim diplomatic immunity, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980), and its
affirmation of the principle that a U.S. state official can be held personally liable for
constitutional violations despite the immunity of the state, id. at 890 (citing Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
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missing the obvious. Rather, this relative silence is better interpreted as
demonstrating a widespread understanding that individuals will not ordinarily be
deemed immune from suit for certain types of conduct, and that any individual
immunity that might exist does not come from the FSIA. Arguments based on
logic, policy, and international law do not support a contrary result.

